Regulation Best Interest (BI) is an amendment the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) added to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 recently (in 2019). This new rule aims to ensure broker-dealers and their registered representatives prioritize the interests of their customers over their own. In particular, Regulation BI imposes rules to follow when these financial professionals make recommendations to retail investors*.
*A retail investor is an individual that invests for themselves or on behalf of their family or friends. Regulation BI does not apply to interactions with institutional customers (financial organizations investing on behalf of their clients).
Broker-dealers are known primarily for their transaction execution services (helping customers buy and sell securities). Most trades processed by broker-dealers are unsolicited (meaning the firm did not recommend the transaction) and are typically self-directed by the investor or recommended by a third party (e.g., a customer’s investment adviser). When recommendations are not a primary part of a financial firm’s business, they largely avoid rules and regulations imposed on investment advisers. This type of financial professional must follow strict fiduciary* laws, which involve numerous disclosures and thorough representative training to protect their clients.
*A fiduciary manages assets on behalf of another person. For example, an investment adviser managing a client’s assets is a fiduciary to their client.
Why are rules related to investment advice so important? Unfortunately, the financial industry has a checkered past riddled with unethical behavior. Here are a few examples:
For decades, investment adviser firms have been subject to recommendation-based regulations meant to prevent unethical activity. Broker-dealers largely avoided them by claiming their businesses focused primarily on executing transactions, not recommendations. But, over the years, it seemed like this was not reality. All the examples above involve broker-dealer representatives who were paid hefty commissions once their clients agreed to their (unsuitable) recommendations. In plain terms, some broker-dealers and their representatives acted as investment advisers* without being regulated accordingly.
*To be considered an investment adviser, a client must make payment specifically for investment advice. Some broker-dealers and representatives providing advice were “skirting” the rules by claiming their commissions were payment for the transaction execution, not the advice. As long as broker-dealers implied that distinction, they were not regulated as investment advisers.
Regulation BI is the SEC’s attempt to close this “loophole.” Broker-dealers and representatives advising retail customers must follow specific rules and protocols, which are outlined in these four categories:
Transparency is vital when financial professionals interact with customers. When aspects of a broker-dealer’s business are hidden, it can erode trust. For example, how would you feel if your assigned representative only recommended securities that made them large commissions? What if there were better securities they avoided recommending because their paycheck would be smaller? You would likely lose faith in the firm, representative, and maybe even the financial industry.
To ensure clients are capable of making informed decisions, Regulation BI requires broker-dealers and their representatives to disclose the following in writing at or prior to any retail customer recommendation:
Broker-dealers provide these disclosures in writing on Form CRS (customer relationship summary). You can explore what this looks like in the real world - here’s a link to Charles Schwab’s Form CRS (the first two pages are Schwab’s broker-dealer portion). The form is divided into these sections:
To comply with Regulation BI, broker-dealers like Charles Schwab must deliver this customer relationship summary to customers during or prior to making recommendations.
Broker-dealers and their representatives must determine the following prior to making a recommendation:
*Although a security or strategy may be in a client’s best interest, it shouldn’t be over-recommended. For example, a specific mutual fund may be suitable and in the client’s best interest, but recommending too much of it is unethical.
As we discussed above, a conflict of interest is any circumstance that jeopardizes the prioritization of the client’s interests. Essentially, these are scenarios where the financial professional has a financial incentive to disregard their client’s needs. Common conflicts of interest in the industry include:
Recommending proprietary products
A product created by the same institution that recommends it to its clients is a proprietary product. For example, a Vanguard mutual fund recommended to clients by Vanguard advisers. The firm (Vanguard in our example) can make two forms of income with these products. First, they collect investment advisory fees*, especially when managing client assets on a discretionary basis. Second, the proprietary product will make additional money for the firm. Using our Vanguard example, the fund collects fees to cover its expense ratio.
*Firms that manage their clients’ assets typically charge assets under management (AUM) fees. For example, a firm charging a 1.5% AUM fee would collect $15,000 annually for managing a $1 million account.
Recommending securities the firm or representative is tied to
Assume you have an account at a broker-dealer and discuss investment strategies regularly with your assigned representative. Let’s say they recommend the stock of a company their spouse is the CEO of without telling you. How would you feel? Are they making the recommendation because it’s suitable? Or because it benefits their spouse?
Recommending securities as part of a sales contest
Many securities firms run sales contests to encourage their representatives to perform. For example, a firm may pay a bonus to the representative encouraging most clients to open discretionary accounts. Financial professionals taking part in these contests have an underlying incentive to “sell sell sell,” even if not in the client’s best interest.
While all the conflicts of interest listed above can be problematic, they’re allowed with proper disclosures. Regulation BI requires the following:
The [broker-dealer] establishes, maintains, and enforces written policies and procedures reasonably designed to:
- Identify and at a minimum disclose … or eliminate, all conflicts of interest associated with such recommendations
- Identify and mitigate any conflicts of interest associated with such recommendations that create an incentive for a [representative] to place [their or their firm’s interests] ahead of the interest of the retail customer
- Identify and eliminate any sales contests, sales quotas, bonuses, and non-cash compensation* that are based on the sales of specific securities** or specific types of securities**
*Non-cash compensation is exactly what it sounds like. For example, a firm gives a representative a free all-paid vacation as a bonus.
**Sales contests are not prohibited as long as the firm discloses properly, but centering a contest around recommending one specific product or type of security creates a bad incentive structure. Firms should not engage in these types of competitions.
Bottom line - firms must identify conflicts of interest, attempt to eliminate them if possible, and disclose them if they can’t be eliminated.
This one is simple - broker-dealers must:
Establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to achieve compliance with Regulation BI
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